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Abstract:  Experimental choice data from 881 subjects based on 40 time-tradeoff items and 32 
risky choice items reveal that most subjects are time-inconsistent and most violate the axioms of 
expected utility theory.  These inconsistencies cannot be explained by well-known theories of 
behavioral inconsistency, such as hyperbolic discounting and cumulative prospect theory.  
Aggregating expected payoffs and the risk associated with each subjects’ 72 choice items, the 
statistical links between inconsistency and total payoffs are reported.  Time-inconsistent subjects 
and those who violate expected utility theory both earn substantially higher expected payoffs, 
and these positive associations survive largely undiminished when included together in total 
payoff regressions.  Consistent subjects earn lower than average payoffs because most of them 
are consistently impatient or consistently risk averse.  Positive payoffs from inconsistency 
cannot, however, be fully explained by greater risk taking.  Controlling for the total risk of each 
subject’s risk choices as well as for socio-economic differences among subjects, time-
inconsistent subjects earn significantly more money, in statistical and economic terms.  So do 
expected utility violators.  Positive returns to inconsistency extend outside the domain in which 
inconsistencies occurs, with time-inconsistent subjects earning more on risky choice items, and 
expected utility violators earning more on time-tradeoff items.  The results seem to call into 
question whether axioms of internal consistency—and violations of these axioms that behavioral 
economists frequently focus on—are economically relevant criteria for evaluating the quality of 
decision making in human populations.   
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Introduction 
Given growing theoretical, empirical and policy literatures dealing with time-inconsistency, one 
could be forgiven for assuming—incorrectly—that there exists abundant evidence documenting 
significant economic costs that result from time-inconsistent choices. This lack of evidence is the 
subject of this paper, which presents experimental results showing the opposite: time-
inconsistent subjects in laboratory experiments earn significantly higher total payoffs.  This, of 
course, does not prove that time-inconsistent people are generally better off, or that myopic 
decision making is not a genuine problem in particular settings.  Rather, this finding adds to a 
little known but important, and growing, collection of empirical results that pose a deep 
methodological challenge to what is perhaps the dominant research program in behavioral 
economics documenting deviations from axiomatic rationality (e.g., intransitivity, non-Nash 
play, violations of expected utility theory, and non-Bayesian behavior).1    
 
                                                 
1
 Although we are aware of no directly relevant evidence about time-inconsistency and total payoffs, there is some 
related evidence, none of which points conclusively in the direction of a positive correlation between consistency 
and payoffs.  Burks, Carpenter, Gotte and Rustichini (2008) report that trainees learning to become truck drivers 
who have lower than average cognitive skills are more likely to lose money on their investment in the training 
program by leaving the trucking program before recouping their out-of-pocket costs of the training program.  
Similarly, Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro (2006) find a modest negative association between cognitive skills and the 
occurrence of preference anomalies, although even very-high-skill individuals frequently exhibit anomalies. 
Jacobson and Petrie (forthcoming) find zero pair-wise correlation between time-inconsistency on experimental time-
preference elicitation instruments (exhibited by 55% of 181 subjects) and financial decision making in the field, and 
zero correlation between risk-aversion instruments and real-world financial decision making.  Putting together time-
inconsistency and risk-preference measures, they report an interaction effect suggesting a slight increase in time-
inconsistent subjects’ rate of using informal financial instruments, which these authors interpret as a mistake, 
although no real cost differentials are reported.  Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006) combine experimental and field 
evidence suggesting that time-inconsistent bank customers are self-aware of the potential pitfalls of impulsivity and 
disproportionately choose to adopt new bank products that offer identical interest rates but added commitment 
devices which voluntarily shrink those savers’ choice sets.  This suggests that even significant numbers of people 
who are inconsistent in the lab are sophisticated in recognizing the vulnerabilities these inconsistencies may cause 
and preemptively deploying successful strategies aimed at accumulating greater wealth.  Chu and Chu (1990) and 
Cherry, Crocker and Shogren (2003) report that subjects who are paid to avoid inconsistent choices quickly learn to 
be consistent.  List and Millimet (2004) show that subjects in the field vary significantly in terms of consistency of 
choice patterns, and that market experience reduces the probability of inconsistent patterns of choice without 
showing, however, that inconsistency leads to reduced levels of economic performance.   
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Ask a behavioral economist what we learn from behavioral economics in applied work aimed at 
educating the public or designing institutions, and you will likely hear calls to help error-prone, 
biased, or irrational humans overcome the systematic pathologies built into their brains (e.g., 
Ariely’s Predictably Irrational, 2008, or Sunstein and Thaler’s Nudge, 2008).  And yet, very 
little evidence exists linking violations of axiomatic rationality to high-stakes differences in real 
people’s lives, such as earnings, physical health, lifespan, and happiness.  In the normative 
behavioral economics literature (Camerer et al, 2003; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2003; Berg, 2003; 
Loewenstein et al, 2007; Bernheim and Rangel, forthcoming) which sometimes articulates a need 
to educate and make policy aimed at “de-biasing” individuals (Jolls and Sunstein, 2006), there is 
ample grounds for concern that prescriptive advice based on behavioral economics takes as its 
goal to enforce internal consistency, including conformity with transitivity, the Savage axioms, 
Bayes Rule, and—yes—time consistency.2   
 
This paper shows, however, that experimental subjects who violate time-consistency and make 
choices over risky gambles that cannot be rationalized with any expected-utility objective 
function wind up earning higher expected payoffs, after controlling for risk, demographic 
variables such as household income, and success in school.  The results imply that decision-
making processes which violate consistency may confer other, often unrecognized, benefits.  The 
results also suggest that economists’ normative analyses may be referencing the wrong 
                                                 
2
 Hubal et al (2007) suggest that behavioral biases in the tradition of Kahneman and Tversky can be used to 
understand recent intelligence failures in the lead-up to the Iraq War and propose to use the behavioral biases and 
anomalies literature to re-design US intelligence policy.  Even the most sympathetic to the insights gleaned from 
psychology, however, may feel that simpler strategic explanations provide more precision and parsimony (e.g., 
following accounts in the popular press, which attribute false information used as a rationale for the invasion of Iraq 
to dishonesty in the executive branch and manipulation of classified information). 
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normative benchmarks if, as behavioral economists often claim, the goal is to add more empirical 
realism and real-world relevance to economic science. 
 
Insofar as behavioral economics stands on the strength of empirical realism and real-world 
relevance, a clear methodological priority would seem to be collecting evidence that provides 
empirical tests of whether standard decision-theoretic axioms of self-consistency provide 
relevant normative benchmarks.  After all, when one takes behavioral economics’ stated priority 
of empirical realism seriously, it suggests a much needed follow-up question: If individuals do 
not conform to standard normative criteria found in axiomatic definitions of rationality, what 
then is the price?     
 
Consider this real-world datum frequently observed along highways throughout the U.S.—
billboards advertising “Vasectomy Reversal.” According to the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), approximately 500,000 men in the U.S. undergo a vasectomy each year, and nearly 10% 
of them later decide to undergo a vasectomy reversal.  Vasectomy reversal costs between $5000 
and $15,000, and it is an elective procedure not covered by most insurance plans, implying that 
the most men who choose to undergo the procedure pay full price, either in lump sum or over 
time with financing.  From the perspective of the null hypothesis of perfect time consistency, one 
may ask how a sequential path of surgeries consisting of vasectomy at time t1 and vasectomy 
reversal at t2 (t1 < t2) might be rationalized as maximization of a stable preference ordering 
applying a single, time-consistent discount rate and exponential discounting. 
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Such a rationalization would seem to require two somewhat unlikely cost-benefit calculations.  
For a present-oriented and time-consistent man, the initial vasectomy would pass the cost-benefit 
calculus based mostly on anticipated short-run flows of increased sexual pleasure without 
worrying about birth control (which seems a likely motivation).  The decision to undergo the 
reversal would have to also pass a cost-benefit test based primarily on the short-run benefits of 
fatherhood (which seems unlikely, or at least inconsistent with much that has been written on 
long-run motivations for procreation in terms of gene propagation).3  On the other hand for a 
very patient future-oriented and time-consistent man, the initial vasectomy decision’s benefits 
would be weighted toward flows of increased sexual pleasure arriving in the future, while 
realizing that this flow will stop or be reduced on the date of the vasectomy reversal.  This does 
not strike us as a plausible account of the decision process leading to the observed sequence of 
choices. 
 
There are doubtless other possible time-consistent rationalizations for choosing two surgeries, 
the second of which reverses the effect of the first.  However, the prediction of any such theory is 
that, at the time of choosing the first surgery, the chooser considers it possible, or even likely, 
that he will elect to have the reversal at a later date.  While we have no direct survey data on this 
point, doctors who offer vasectomies routinely warn patients that the procedure is permanent.  
According to the National Institute of Health (2008), reversing the vasectomy is “difficult, 
expensive, and often unsuccessful.”  Thus, a more parsimonious explanation for the choice of 
vasectomy reversal is simply a change of heart, that is, a change in preferences—where time 
                                                 
3
 Although some people may draw substantial short-run utility from parenting toddlers and teenagers, research at the 
intersection of economics and evolutionary biology would seem to suggest that far-off future benefit flows, perhaps 
extending beyond the parent’s lifetime, are the most significant motivators for producing children. 
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preferences shift from placing more weight on the short-run to more weight on future flows of 
benefits. 
 
If men choosing vasectomy reversals are time-inconsistent, then so what?  Do these deviations 
from consistency cause systematic economic harm?  We would caution anyone eager to label 
purchasers of vasectomy reversals as “irrational” that these men are, after all, financially well-off 
enough to afford the surgery.  They have sufficient physical health and leisure to invest time and 
money in pursuing enhanced sexual pleasure (without worrying about birth control).  Thus, one 
would be hard-pressed to label them as economic failures.   Their apparent time-inconsistency 
allows a shift toward future-oriented priorities placing significant weight on procreation, which 
would likely receive positive evaluation according to many moral traditions as well as scientific 
norms of evolutionary fitness in evolutionary biology.  We suspect, too, that many parents would 
strongly approve of the transformation of their adult child’s preferences—from large to small 
discount rates. 
 
Although further study of vasectomy patients and their time preferences in the field would be 
interesting to pursue, this paper turns to laboratory data to investigate an analogous tension 
between two distinct normative measures that arise in the example of men who choose 
vasectomy reversal—internal consistency on the one hand versus the level of payoffs 
(unconditionally and conditioning on risk-taking and demographic differences) on the other.   
 
We present laboratory evidence using standard experimental instruments for eliciting time and 
risk preferences that document a surprising positive return on three distinct forms of 
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inconsistency, the most dramatic of which is the positive return on time-inconsistency.  Expected 
returns for 72 choices in a laboratory experiment (40 time-tradeoff and 32 risky choice items) 
were tabulated together with the standard deviation of all risky choices under the assumption that 
gambles across all risky choice items were uncorrelated.  A variety of time-inconsistency 
measures were computed, the simplest of which is a binary indicator for any subject whose 
required compensation for waiting switched on pairs of time-tradeoff items with identical 
payoffs, identical duration between arrivals of payoffs switched, but different front-end delays.  
The second form of inconsistency is a kind frequently documented in experimental studies with 
multiple risky choice items, where subjects’ choices cannot be rationalized as maximization of 
any expected utility function (e.g., a strictly risk-loving choice in one pair of choice items, and 
strictly risk-averse on others).  The third form of inconsistency was measured by counting the 
number of non-matching responses for a subset of the sample who were invited back to repeat 
the same exact series of 72 choice items six months later, which we refer to as between-session 
inconsistency.  Unconditionally and conditionally (controlling for risk-taking and a long vector 
of demographic information), maximally consistent subjects, on average, earned less money. 
 
Positive returns on inconsistency appear to extend beyond the choice domain in which they are 
measured.   For example, time-inconsistent subjects not only earn more on time-tradeoff choice 
items, they also earn more on risky choice problems with no time component.  Similarly, 
subjects with inconsistent responses to risk-preference measures (i.e., those whose choices 
violate consistency axioms needed for an expected utility representation of risk preferences) earn 
more on time-trade-off choice items with no risky-choice component.  Overall, subjects who 
violate time-consistency, violate expected utility theory, or make inconsistent choices on 
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identical choice problems when repeating them on different days earn significantly higher 
payoffs than subjects who are perfectly consistent.   
 
Calls to use behavioral economics as a prescriptive basis for institutional design, such as 
O’Donoghue and Rabin’s (2003a, 2003b) suggestion to tax potato chips and subsidize carrots, or 
Thaler and colleague’s (Thaler and Behartzi , 2004; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) focus on 
changing defaults in savings plans, organ donation rules, and the positioning of dessert on the 
buffet line, naturally raise controversy.  What seems clear, however, is the need for further 
investigation into normative behavioral economics in two directions—not only documenting 
real-world deviations from received normative benchmarks, but also investigating whether the 
normative measures we use are relevant to the economic problems we face. 
 
If individuals fail the normative axiom of time-consistency while succeeding by other normative 
measures in a competitive American environment—at least surviving and, perhaps, thriving— 
then how is tension between decision-theoretic norms of internal consistency and other 
compelling economic norms—like how much money one has—to be resolved?  (For example, 
men who can afford a $5,000 to $15,000 elective surgery may be internally inconsistent but 
economically well-off.)  The dominant view in behavioral economics is that the norms of 
internal consistency are right and that human behavior is mistaken, even if those behaviors are 
manifestly well-performing by other metrics.  An alternative view is that empirical normative 
science should seek to describe the characteristics of good decision making and discard 
theoretical constructs that do not describe what successful decision makers actually do.  Why 
should we rely on commonly repeated folk reasoning in economics (with no empirical support) 
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that there exist competitive forces in market economies that punish people whose choices violate 
internal consistency axioms (e.g., the money pump thought experiment as “proof” that 
intransitive preferences cannot survive, even though intransitivities are probably widespread in 
human populations)?   
 
The biological literature provides positive theory as to why inconsistency can confer adaptive 
benefits.  Buchstaber and Langsam (1985) argue that if nature tuned organisms optimally to any 
particular environment, it would lead to severe disadvantage in the face of changing 
environments, whereas less stringent satisficing rules promote fitness by allowing for much more 
flexible and faster adaptation to changing ecologies as they are buffeted by occasional random 
shocks (also see Schmidtz, 1995).  There would seem to be obvious extensions of this intuition to 
human populations in contemporary environments, where being imaginative, entrepreneurial, 
and creative—or just flexible enough to survive life—sometimes requires one to inconsistently 
experiment, to change one’s mind, or to use context-specific action rules rather than complete 
and self-consistent orderings of the elements in one’s action space.  It should not stretch one’s 
imagination too far to envision humans who enjoy adaptive benefits by sometimes changing the 
weights they place on different factors out-competing those who dogmatically conform to the 
stricture of maximizing a time-separable utility function with exponential weighting. 
 
While there is clear tension between economics’ classical and neoclassical commitment to the 
Libertarian principle of consumer sovereignty and new rationales for interventions based on 
behavioral economics’ re-discovery of human irrationality, there is another, more fundamental 
cause for concern about these paternalistic initiatives—even for writers like ourselves, who 
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believe that neoclassical models of externalities and information asymmetries already provide 
very convincing rationales for government intervention to help market economies flourish.   
 
The problem is this: the vast majority of studies claiming to have discovered irrationality take as 
their benchmark axioms of internal consistency.  Psychologist Ken Hammond (1996) lays out an 
important distinction that is at the heart of this paper, contrasting two systems of evaluative 
criteria aimed at saying what it means to make good decisions and how to measure whose 
decision procedures are performing better.  As everyone knows, the standard economic theory of 
time-consistent inter-temporal choice does not say how patient one should be, even though it is 
obvious that greater patience leads to larger accumulations of wealth, all else equal.  The inter-
temporal choice theory merely says that if I rank x dollars at time t1 over y dollars at time t2, with 
x < y and t1 < t2, then I should always rank x dollars at time t3 over y dollars at time t4 as long as 
the wait between the arrivals of those payoffs, which we refer to as the appreciation interval, is 
at least as long: t3 – t4 > t1 – t2.  According to this coherence norm, a person who spends his 
entire paycheck for a party on the day his paycheck arrives is rational (i.e., time consistent) as 
long as he remains equally impatient for the rest of his life–throwing parties that exhaust his 
entire paycheck each time a paycheck arrives.  If, on the other hand, this highly impatient and 
perhaps impulsive person moderates his impatience and begins to save money, then the axiom of 
time-consistency deems his behavior as irrational.   
 
The intuitive lack of appeal in this kind of normative analysis seems obvious.  Yet much of our 
discipline proceeds as if on the basis of a firmly established law of social science that people 
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should maximize an additively separable objective function with exponential discounting—or 
otherwise go to hell after living an unhappy and evolutionarily disadvantaged life.  The tension 
here lies in the difference between coherence and correspondence—that is, between standard 
economic norms of internal consistency and alternative evaluative criteria, such as how much 
money is in one’s bank account, physical health, happiness, or the accuracy of one’s beliefs.  In 
contrast to coherence norms based on internal consistency, correspondence norms evaluate 
decisions and inferences according to how well they are calibrated to the environments in which 
they are used (also referred to as ecological rationality by Gigerenzer et. al., 1999, and Smith, 
2003)—normative evaluations that measure consequences of decision procedure in terms of how 
well-endowed decision makers are in terms of finance or fitness, how healthy, how happy, and 
how accurate.  To perform well by these correspondence norms does not require internal 
consistency at all.   
 
In Hammond’s framework, decision makers can be internally consistent, but completely 
indebted, in miserable health, unhappy—and perhaps most surprising, one’s beliefs can be 
entirely self-consistent in the sense of conforming to Bayes’ Rule and the definition of 
conditional probability, and yet completely wrong about everything one believes!   
 
Section 2 describes the data and different empirical measures of inconsistency used in this 
investigation.  Section 3 reports unconditional and conditional statistical links between different 
forms of inconsistency and expected payoffs.  Section 4 incorporates measures of risk, and 
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of how the empirical findings can be interpreted. 
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Section 2: Data 
The data used in this study were collected from March, 2002, through the beginning of 2003 in 
the Canadian cities of Calgary, Ottawa, Vancouver, Halifax, Toronto, and several rural locations.  
The data analyzed here consist primarily of 40 time-tradeoff choices and 32 risky choices (31 of 
which were binary), together with demographic information from post-experiment surveys.  The 
time-tradeoff data provide multiple measures of time preference from which individual-level 
measures of time-inconsistency can be derived.  The risky choice data provide multiple measures 
of risk preferences from which individual-level measures of expected-utility violations (i.e., an 
indicator marking inconsistencies that cannot be rationalized as maximization of an expected 
utility objective function).   
 
 Of the 881 subjects for whom these data were collected in initial sessions, 156 were invited 
back, roughly six months after their initial sessions, to make the same exact time-tradeoff and 
risky choices a second time.  Thus, in addition to within-session time inconsistency and within-
session expected-utility violations that were measured for all 881 subjects, a third type of 
between-session inconsistency is available for the invited-back subsample of 156.  For these 
invited-back subjects, between-session inconsistency can be measured simply by counting the 
number (ranging from 0 to 72) of time-tradeoff and risky choice items answered differently 
between sessions.  Most of the analysis below focuses on relationships between the first two 
within-session inconsistencies taken from the initial experimental sessions and each subject’s 
total risk-taking and expected earnings.  In a later section, we analyze between-session 
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inconsistencies and report its conditional effect on total payoffs controlling for the first two 
forms of inconsistency. 
 
Time Inconsistency 
Table 1 outlines how the 40 binary time-tradeoff items are grouped into eight choice sequences 
of five binary choices, where the binary choices in each choice sequence have fixed arrival dates 
of payoffs (i.e., identical front-end delay and appreciation interval), the same time-1 payoff, and 
contains binary choices that vary only by increasing sizes of the time-2 payoff (i.e., monotonic 
improvements in the net payoff for patience).    First, Table 1 describes the general structure of 
all 40 binary time-tradeoff items: subjects choose between option 1, which consists of a smaller 
and sooner payoff x arriving at t1, versus option 2, which consists of a larger and later payoff y 
arriving at  t2 (x < y, t1 < t2).  Thus, the appreciation interval is t2 – t1 and the net payoff for 
patience is y – x.   To avoid confounding levels and percentages, we parameterize y in terms of 
its implicit annualized rate of return (assuming no compounding), the solution in r to  
y = x(1+ r)(t2 – t1), where t1 and t2 are measured in years.  The early payoff x is always stated to 
subjects as a level, and the later payoff y is also stated as a level, together with the implied 
annual percentage return r and the absolute return y - x. 
 
 A choice sequence can be represented as a binary string that directly reveals an individual’s time 
preference, letting annualized percentage returns rj range over r1 < r2 < … < rJ and recording the 
jth binary choice, Cj, as 0 if the sooner and smaller (i.e., impatient) payoff is chosen and 1 if the 
later and larger (i.e., patient) payoff is chosen.  This produces binary choice sequences of the 
form C1C2….CJ with the following property.  The earlier in this sequence (in which payoffs for 
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patience are increasing in j) that the subject chooses the patient option (i.e., the earlier in the 
sequence that the first 1 appears), the more patient that subject is.  For subjects whose 
preferences are monotonically increasing in payoffs, a zero can never follow a one, because that 
would imply acceptance of yj – xj as compensation for waiting the appreciation interval t2 – t1, 
but refusal of the larger net payoff yj+1 – xj+1 >  yj – xj as compensation for waiting an identical 
appreciation interval.  Therefore, we say that sequence S is more patient than sequence S’ iff, 
when evaluated as integers, S > S’. 
 
The experimenter-controlled appreciation interval, t2 – t1, is fixed at one month in the first four 
sequences and one year in sequences five through eight.  Within each of these sets of sequences 
with fixed t2 – t1, the four sequences differ only by increasing front end delays, as shown at the 
bottom of Table 1 and spelled out in full detail in the following list, where the five component 
choices of each of the eight sequences is formed by letting rj range over the values 0.05, 0.20, 
0.50, 1.00 and 2.00 : 
S1: Do you prefer $65 today or $65(1+rj/12) one month from today? 
S2: Do you prefer $65 tomorrow or $65(1+rj/12) one month and one day from today? 
S3: Do you prefer $65 one month from today or $65(1+rj/12) two months from today? 
S4: Do you prefer $65 one year from today or $65(1+rj/12) one month and one year from 
today.4 
                                                 
4
 The formula 65(1+r/12) is, of course, an approximation of 65(1+r)1/12 . The approximation is quite good for small r 
and, in all cases, is slightly larger than the formula with the fractional exponent.  This approximation is commonly 
used by finance industry professionals and provides a shortcut by which subjects could verify (if they wanted to) 
that the dollar payoffs did indeed correctly reflect the annual rates of return printed in the booklets that subjects 
used.   
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S5: Do you prefer $65 today or $65(1+rj) one year from today? 
S6: Do you prefer $65 tomorrow or $65(1+rj) one year and one day from today? 
S7: Do you prefer $65 one month from today or $65(1+rj) one year and one month from 
today? 
S8: Do you prefer $65 one year from today or $65(1+rj) one month and one year from 
today. 
 
Part c of Table 1 shows the sequence denoted as S5 in the list above as it was presented to 
subjects.  Given the definition of “more patient sequence” (which is a complete order over any 
space of binary choice sequences elicited using increasing net payoffs for patience), the six 
monotonic (out of 25=32 possible) sequences are ordered from least to most patient as follows: 
00000, 00001, 00011, 00111, 01111, 11111.5   
 
As Table 1 indicates, we can now define time inconsistency empirically, in the coarsest or most 
inclusive sense, by an indicator variable that flags mismatches among any two sequences with 
the same appreciation interval t2 – t1.  We say that a subject is time-inconsistent if there is one or 
more mismatching sequences among sequences S1, S2, S3 and S4, or one or more mismatching 
sequences among S5, S6, S7 and S8.  This broad measure of time-inconsistency can be refined in 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
5Monotonicity refers to time preferences that always rank greater compensation for an equal or smaller between-
arrival waiting duration over smaller compensation for an equal or larger between-arrival waiting duration.  A few 
nonmonotonic responses were observed for each of the eight arrival-date treatments, as is typical in a variety of 
preference elicitation techniques that do not impose monotonicity a priori (Jacobson and Petiei, forthcoming).   
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several ways.  One way is to measure inconsistency in one-month condition (i.e., one or more 
inconsistencies among sequences S1, S2, S3 and S4) separately from inconsistency in one-year 
condition (i.e., among S5, S6, S7 and S8).  We also record a count variable tallying instances of 
time-inconsistency, which ranges from 0 to 6, since the maximum number of mismatches among 
four sequences is 3 (the number of unique pairs from the combinatoric formula, 4!/(2!2!), for 4 
choose 2).  In addition, we report data on the direction of time-inconsistency, which connects the 
evidence reported here to a large theoretical and empirical literature on hyperbolic discounting 
and temptation (Laibson, 1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; Coller, Harrison and Rutström, 
2005).   
 
In our framework, an individual is a hyperbolic discounter iff his or her sequences satisfy the 
inequalities S1 ≤ S2 ≤ S3 ≤ S4 and S5 ≤ S6 ≤ S7 ≤ S8, with at least one weak inequality holding 
strictly—a definition that requires all instances of time-inconsistency to be shifts from less 
patient to more patient as the front end delays move further into the future.  Similarly, an 
individual is a hypo-bolic discounter if he or she shifts in the opposite direction, from patient in 
the short-run to impatient in the long-run: S1 ≥ S2 ≥ S3 ≥ S4 and S5 ≥ S6 ≥ S7 ≥ S8, with at least 
one inequality holding strictly.  Although hyperbolic and hypo-bolic discounters are nonempty 
subsets among the time-inconsistent, most time-inconsistent subjects are shift in both directions 
at least once, implying that they are neither (strictly) hyperbolic or hypo-bolic discounters.  We 
construct a count variable on the net number of hyperbolic minus hypo-bolic shifts to look for 
evidence of a systematic direction of time-inconsistency.   
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Table 2 shows empirical distributions for the time-tradeoff sequences S1 and S4 to examine one 
among the six pairs of sequences in which instances of time-inconsistency can be observed.  
Both S1 and S4 have a one month appreciation intervals (t2 – t1 = 1/12).  In S1, the first arrival 
date t1 is “today” (i.e., zero front-end delay).  In S4, the first arrival date is one year from today 
(i.e., front-end delay of one year).  Of 881 subjects, 579 are time-inconsistent based on these two 
sequences only.  Among time-inconsistent subjects, shifts toward increasing patience are three to 
four times more likely than shifts toward impatience, which is the strongest evidence for 
hyperbolic discounting in our data but does not survive when directions of shifts are pooled over 
all six pairs.  The next-to-last column shows the empirical distribution among subjects who are 
consistent, revealing that the modal sequence chosen by consistent subject is maximally 
impatient: 00000.  Nearly 60 percent of consistent subjects are in the impatient half of the 
empirical distribution (00000, 00001 or 00011).  
 
In contrast, the final column shows the empirical distribution from S4 among those who 
switched, showing a startling difference in the distribution of destinations to where these subjects 
switched compared to the choice sequences of consistent subjects.  The modal destination choice 
among time-inconsistent subjects is the maximally patient choice sequence 11111, chosen by 
42.5 percent of the time-inconsistent subjects.   
 
These very different distributions in the final two columns of Table 2 illustrate an interesting 
challenge to normative interpretations of time-inconsistency.  If most time-consistent subjects are 
consistently impatient, while time-inconsistent subjects produce a time-preference distribution 
that is on average more patient, then would anyone really suggest intervening pedagogically 
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(e.g., teaching MBAs to be time-consistent) or with institutional change aimed at achieving 
consistency?  Table 2 shows one at least one choice environment in which it would seem 
reasonable to conjecture that time-inconsistent subjects earn higher payoffs on average, after 
transforming all cash flows to present value using reasonable market discount rates.  Before we 
pursue this empirical link between payoffs and consistency, we report detailed statistics for time-
inconsistency in one-month and one-year appreciation interval conditions. 
 
Table 3 tabulates aggregate numbers of time-inconsistent choices between pairs of sequences in 
the order in which they were implemented in the laboratory.  The number of subjects providing 
inconsistent time-tradeoff sequences varies substantially, ranging from 152 subjects whose S1 
and S2 choice sequences are mismatched to 469 subjects whose S7 and S8 choice sequences are 
mismatched.  Recall from Table 2 that even greater numbers of mismatched choice sequences 
are observed among other pairs of sequences (e.g., S1 and S4).  Taking the union of all 
individuals with one or more time-inconsistencies in the one-month treatments leads to 636 
subjects recorded as ones using the one-month-condition-specific indicator TI_month.  Taking 
the union of all individuals with one or more mismatched sequences on one-year condition leads 
to 614 subjects indicated by TI_year = 1.   
 
Several observations from Table 3 are important for seeing that time-inconsistency should not be 
interpreted as random error (i.e., a tremble).  First, the number of inconsistent responses grows 
substantially from S1 to S4, whereas they would be uniformly distributed (or decreasing with 
experience in models where learning is hypothesized to reduce inconsistency).  In S5 through S8, 
inconsistent responses once again grow substantially.  And the fact that the number of 
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inconsistencies in the later one-year treatments (S5-S8) is not significantly less than in earlier 
one-month treatments (S1-S4) is yet another pattern that speaks against the random error or 
learning-reduces-inconsistency models. If learning reduced time inconsistency, then one would 
expect to see fewer instances of it in the last 20 binary time-tradeoff choices than the first 20, yet 
we observe roughly equal numbers in the first and last halves of the time-tradeoff data.  Another 
piece of evidence against the random tremble explanation is that we would expect many more 
nonmonotonic sequences among the sequences that subjects switched to.  If inconsistent choice 
sequences were the result of random trembles, we would expect the fraction of all switched-to 
sequences that are monotonic of only 5/31, whereas the observed fraction is approaching one: 
more than 99 percent of all switches are switches from one monotonic sequence to another. 
 
Table 4 reveals another surprising pattern regarding time-inconsistency, which is its surprising 
lack of overlap in one-month and one-year conditions.  Counting the number of subjects in the 
union of TI_month=1 or TI_year=1 (i.e., those who were time-inconsistent in the one-month or 
one-year treatments) reveals a total of 758 out of 881 time-inconsistent subjects.   Looking at the 
cross-tabulation of TI_month and TI_year, which shows counts on consistency and inconsistency 
in one-month and one-year conditions, one finds that although 492 subjects were time-
inconsistent in both conditions and 123 were time-consistent in both, a surprisingly large 
number—266 subjects—were time-inconsistent in one or the other sets of conditions, but not 
both. 
 
Table 5 presents empirical distributions for count variables that tally instances of different kinds 
of time-inconsistent shifts.  The first count variable in Table 5 tallies all forms of time-
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inconsistency, ranging from a minimum of zero (which occurs when S1=S2=S3=S4 and 
S5=S6=S7=S8) to a maximum of six (which occurs when S1, S2, S3 and S4 are all unequal, and 
S5, S6, S7 and S8 are all unequal).  With a modal time-inconsistency count of 2 and more than 
140 individuals tallying four to six time-inconsistencies, it is clear that the typical time-
inconsistent individual is time-inconsistent more than once.  The columns of Table 5 labeled “1-
month” and “1-year” present empirical distributions for analogously defined count variables 
restricted to pairs in one-month (S1-S4) and one-year conditions (S5-S8), respectively, revealing 
more than 50 individuals in each case (more than 100 unique individuals: 53 + 59 – 6 = 106) 
who were maximally time-inconsistent in one of the two conditions.  Although the link between 
payoffs and inconsistency is documented below, we note here (since these groups are not 
analyzed separately below) that subjects who were maximally time-inconsistent in one-month 
condition earned significantly higher payoffs (details to follow); subjects who were maximally 
time-inconsistent in one-year conditions earned significantly higher payoffs; and pooled 
together, of course, the 106 maximally time-inconsistent subjects earned higher-than-average 
payoffs.  These bivariate correlations indicate that the scope of beneficial time-inconsistency 
goes well beyond switching once or twice in the direction of increased patience.  
 
As defined earlier, hyperbolic discounting refers to a particular form of time-inconsistency in 
which the compensation required for waiting (a fixed appreciation interval in order to receive a 
larger payoff) decreases, the further forward into the future the waiting begins.  Hyperbolic 
discounting occurs, for example, when a return of 50% or more is required to induce waiting one 
year versus receiving the first payoff today, but only 5 or 20% is required to induce waiting one 
year from tomorrow versus receiving the sooner payoff tomorrow.  In both cases, the wait is 
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precisely one year, but it matters to many people whether that wait begins sooner rather than 
later.   
 
Counts on hyperbolic and hypo-bolic shifts show an interesting pattern.  Although slightly more 
hyperbolic shifts were observed in the one-month treatment, slightly more hypo-bolic shifts were 
observed in the one-year treatment.  Thus, no clear directional pattern of time-inconsistent shifts 
emerges from these data.   
 
The three columns under the heading “NetHYP_count” count the number of hyperbolic shifts 
minus hypo-bolic shifts.  The high frequency of subjects who shift in opposite directions at least 
once can be seen by comparing corresponding columns under NetHYP_count and HYP_count 
and HYPO_count, respectively.  For example, the column under the heading “HYPO_count” 
shows that 5 subjects have 4 hypo-bolic shifts, whereas under the heading NetHYP_count one 
finds only 2 subjects that have a net count of -4 (i.e., 4 hypo-bolic shifts).  The apparent 
discrepancy reflects the fact that 3 among the 5 subjects (who made 4 hypo-bolic shifts) also 
made one or two hyperbolic shifts as well, which changed their NetHYPcount values from -4 
toward zero.  The final two columns of Table 5 are counts on two indicator variables that mark 
subjects who make one or more shifts in the same direction and no shifts in the opposite 
direction.  Of the 778 time-inconsistent subjects, only 211 are pure hyperbolic shifters and 144 
are pure hypo-bolic shifters, which leaves 403 subjects who shift in opposite directions at least 
once. 
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Despite intense interest in hyperbolic discounting in some literatures, these experimental data 
provide no empirical support for hyperbolic discounting as a general explanation for observed 
time-inconsistency.  Figure 1 shows three empirical distributions over subjects’ counts of 
hyperbolic shifts minus the number of hypo-bolic shifts— NetHYPcount.  These distributions 
appear to be centered at zero and rather symmetrical in all three cases.  If the hyperbolic 
discounting model were the mechanism behind time-inconsistency, then we would expect these 
distributions to be substantially shifted to the right of zero.   
 
One can examine whether the choice items with options for same-day payoffs drive most 
instances of time-inconsistency, and whether the hyperbolic discounting theory enjoys more 
empirical support after eliminating these pairs from consideration when counting instances of 
time-inconsistency.  Table 5B show that the data do not support this interpretation—that time-
inconsistencies are mostly generated by same-day choice items or that, after removing same-day-
payoff choice items, most time-inconsistency can be explained as hyperbolic shifts.  Eliminating 
same-day-payoff choice items from consideration increases the number of time-consistent 
subjects by only 23, from 123 to 146.  And removing pairs of choice sequences with same-day-
payoffs increases the number of pure hyperbolic discounters by only 28, from 211 to 239. 
 
Risky Choice Data 
This subsection describes how inconsistency with respect to expected-utility theory was 
measured.  Subjects were asked to make 31 choices between pairs of gambles (one of which was 
often a sure thing), and one choice among six gambles.  Two widely used experimental 
instruments for measuring risk-aversion (Holt-Laury (xxx) and Eckel-Grossman (xxx)) were 
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among these, as well as an ambiguity aversion instrument consisting of choices over gambles 
with unknown probabilities. 
 
Two of the risky choice items were mean-preserving spreads often used to categorize subjects as 
strictly risk-averse versus weakly risk-loving.  A cross-tabulation of these choices is shown in 
Table 6.  In choice 1, subjects choose between $60 for sure versus $120 with probability 5/10 
and $0 otherwise.  In choice 2, subjects choose between $60 for sure versus $80 with probability 
5/10 and $40 otherwise.  The 409 + 53 = 462 subjects in the off-diagonal cells appear to switch 
from risk-averse to risk-loving (or the reverse) and cannot be rationalized as having maximized 
an expected utility objective unless it is perfectly risk neutral.  Other risky choice items gave 
subjects an opportunity to more sharply reveal risk neutrality (by providing risk-neutral 
responses on the Holt-Laury and Eckel-Grossman instruments).  But only 37 of the 462 off-
diagonal subjects in Table 6 are risk-neutral on the Holt-Laury instrument, and only 25 are risk-
neutral on both Holt-Laury and Eckel-Grossman.  Informal data collection on this pair of 
gambles from hundreds of our students reveal that many people, often a majority, choose 
inconsistently on these gambles (from the point of view of expected utility theory), and justify 
these choices, not in terms of risk neutrality, but by expressing a strong preference in favor of 
risk-taking on choice 2 and against risk-taking in choice 1.  We feel that this is not necessarily 
crazy or irrational behavior, although it surely is a violation of expected utility theory (see Rabin 
(2000) for more examples of reasonable preferences in risky choice that admit no expected-
utility representation).   
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The risky choice data provide additional opportunities for subjects to step outside the expected-
utility preference model, as documented in Table 7.  The two choice items from Table 6 indicate 
(conservatively) 422 EU violators.  Combining these with the Eckel-Grossman measure raises 
the tally of EU violators to 496.   
 
Another 79 subjects violated a basic monotonicity property implied by expected utility theory.  
These subjects preferred the gamble G (payoff H with probability p and payoff L with 
probability 1-p) over the sure thing S, but ranked the higher-probability-of-winning G’ (payoff H 
with probability p + ε and payoff L with probability 1 – p – ε, 1 − p > ε > 0) as inferior to S. A 
similar nonmonotonicity can be seen in the choice data from 16 ambiguity aversion items, which 
take the form: Gamble A (60 to 90% chance at winning $50) versus Gamble B ($s cash today), 
where s ranges from $18 to $48 in increasing $2 increments.  If a subject were maximizing an 
expected-utility objective function with any prior distribution on the probability of winning, then 
monotonicity would require that, if B with sure-thing payoff s is preferred over gamble A, then B 
with sure-thing payoff s+2 should also be preferred over A.  There were 57 subjects in our 
sample who violated monotonicity in this way.   Taking the union of all EU-violation indicators 
leads to 553 EU violators in the sample. 
 
Section 3: Results on Inconsistency and Total Payoffs 
This section reports unconditional and conditional differences in expected payoffs as a function 
of different forms of inconsistency.   
 
Payoff and Risk Measures 
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Each subject’s total expected payoff was computed as follows.  The 40 time-tradeoff items were 
assigned payoffs equal to the present value of subjects’ choices (from the perspective of a 
Canadian subject in 2002-2003) using a discount factor of 0.05.6   Risky choice items were 
mapped into the expected value of each subject’s choice.  Ambiguous gambles of the form “60 to 
90 percent chance at winning $50” were translated to expected value using a uniform prior on the 
chance at winning (expected chance of winning equal to 75 percent).  The variable we refer to as 
“total expected payoff” is simply the sum of present values and expected values across these 72 
choice items.   
 
Total risk was computed under the assumption of zero correlation among gambles in separate 
choice items.  The variance of each gamble was computed and summed before taking the square 
root to produce a total standard deviation, which is the total risk measure referred to in the 
remainder of the paper.  Time-tradeoff items contributed zero to total risk. 
 
Payoffs and Inconsistency 
Table 8 presents unconditional differences in total expected payoffs among time-inconsistent and 
EU-violator subsamples, respectively.  The left-hand side of Table 8 presents means and ranges 
for total payoffs, total risk, and the sum of payoffs on different subsets of the choice items: 1-
month appreciation interval, 1-year appreciation interval, all risky choices, the Eckel-Grossman 
choice item alone, the 10 Holt-Laury items, five other risky-choice items, and 16 ambiguity-
                                                 
6
 According to the Bank of Canada’s Department of Monetary and Financial Analysis, rates on 91-day treasuries 
varied between 2.25 and 3 percent from March, 2002, through January, 2003.  Commercial borrowing rates were 
probably above 5 percent during this time, whereas interest rates on time deposits were probably less than 2 percent.  
Thus, the appropriate discount rate for future cash flows is not precisely known.  Fortunately, none of the cash flows 
in our experimental items have a time horizon longer than two years, and the reported differences in payoffs are not 
even remotely sensitive to changes in the discount rate between 1 and 10 percent. 
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aversion choice items.  The empirical ranges and sizes of those ranges (reported in the left-hand 
block of Table 8) are important for judging the economic significance of the differences in 
expected payoffs reported in the far right-hand column.   
 
The right-hand block of Table 8 reports differences in (not levels of) mean payoffs for 
inconsistent subjects relative to consistent subjects.  Notice that all these changes are positive, 
indicating that inconsistent subjects in all subsets of choice items achieved higher expected 
payoffs although these increases were not always statistically significant.   Below each change in 
expected payoffs is the p-value associated with a two-sided unconditional t-test of equality of 
means between the inconsistent and consistent populations.   
 
The average time-inconsistent subject earns $213 more than the average time-consistent subject.  
And the average EU-violator earns $112 more than the average non-EU-violator.  Both 
differences are statistically significant and, as conditional effects from regressions reported 
below show, these differences are independently significant even after adding controls for risk-
taking and demographic information including household income.  The size of these effects 
should be judged as economically significant because, together, they cover more than one fourth 
of the entire total payoff range of $1,159 (maximum payoff minus minimum payoff =).  One 
observation from Table 8 that might explain why EU violators earn higher payoffs is that they 
take somewhat more risk, 21.5 additional standard deviations on a range of size 201.  However, 
this is far from the entire story, as Table 8 also shows that the average EU violator earns $93 
more on time-tradeoff items and the average time-inconsistent subject earns an extra $14 or $15 
on risky choice items. 
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Most of the gains from time-inconsistency show up as the $199 positive differential in payoffs 
on time-tradeoff items, and most this difference comes from one-year appreciation interval items 
where the gains from patience are largest.  Beyond the raw earnings advantages among 
inconsistent subjects, we want to underscore that inconsistency in the risky-choice domain 
appears to have positive predictive power for earnings in the time domain, just as inconsistency 
in the time domain has predictive power for earnings in the risk-choice domain.  This cross-
domain predictive power of inconsistency survives in regression analysis, suggesting an 
interesting normative puzzle as to why inconsistency might yield benefits both inside the domain 
in which inconsistent choices are committed and beyond.   
 
Before turning to the payoff regressions, we want to first consider the role of risk-taking as it is 
conventionally measured.  Figure 2 presents a scatterplot of total risk and total payoffs.  Plotted 
together, the northern-most points (i.e., convex closure of the points) in the figure represent an 
empirical risk-reward envelope across all subjects’ choices in the experiment.  Points along this 
empirical risk-reward envelope show the maximum payoff achieved among subjects for each 
level of risk or, equivalently, the minimum risk achieved at each payoff level.      
 
In Figure 2, perfectly consistent subjects (time-consistent non-EU-violators) are plotted as 
squares, and everyone else as dots.  “Everyone else” consists of subjects who are time-
inconsistent or EU-violators (or both).  While there are some squares located along or near the 
risk-reward envelope, most of them are deep inside the interior of the feasible risk-payoff choice 
set.  The reason is that most of the consistent subjects are consistently impatient and consistently 
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risk-averse, implying lower present-value payoffs on both time-tradeoff and risky-choice items.  
In contrast, while we observe some dots also located deep in the interior (i.e., far from the 
efficient envelope), most are clustered near the efficient frontier.  Thus, the scatterplot implies 
that inconsistent subjects achieve more efficiency according to this very standard risk-return 
benchmark than consistent subjects do.  A similar scatterplot with the y-axis replaced by 
expected payoffs on risky-choice items alone produces a similar result.  Yet another statistical 
test of this difference in efficiency can be computed by fitting regressions of total payoffs (or 
payoffs from risky-choice items alone) on a quadratic in variance.  Based on the data in the 
figure, this quadratic regression line among consistent subjects lies strictly below that of 
consistent subjects on the relevant range of variances, and this difference is statistically 
significant. 
 
Table 9 reports the main results regarding the conditional effects of inconsistency on expected 
payoffs, using three regression models of total expected payoffs as a function of time-
inconsistency and EU-violator status.  Model 1 demonstrates that these different forms of 
inconsistency have independent predictive power.  Furthermore, the effects of inconsistency on 
payoffs retain nearly the full magnitude of their respective unconditional effects, even after 
allowing for correlation between the two inconsistencies to absorb a portion of the other’s effect.   
 
Model 2 in Table 9 adds total risk-taking to the regression, which hardly reduces the effect size 
of time-inconsistency at all.  After controlling for risk-taking, there remains a large effect size for 
EU-violator status as well—of $56, which is more than half the unconditional effect size 
reported in Table 8.  This means that EU-violators achieve higher earnings, partly because they 
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take more risk, but also because of something else that correlates with EU-inconsistency, which 
is not correlated with time-inconsistency.   
 
In Model 3 of Table 9, another 20 demographic and survey-item variables are included as 
controls (for age, gender, marital status, geography, personal debt, household income, attitudes 
toward school, and success in school).  Model 3 shows that these positive, large-magnitude and 
independently significant effects of inconsistency on payoffs are robust to a variety of other 
sources of interpersonal variation.  Adding demographic controls makes the time-inconsistency 
and risk-taking coefficients increase slightly, while the EU-violator coefficient declines slightly, 
but remains large.  Almost none of the time-inconsistency effect can be made to go away with 
the inclusion of risk-taking and demographic information.  A little more than half of the EU-
violator effect goes away with the inclusion of controls.  In no case does one form of 
inconsistency appear to absorb much of the effect size of the other, possibly suggesting distinct 
mechanisms generating these two statistical links.   
 
Between-Session Inconsistency 
As mentioned earlier, 156 of 881 subjects returned to the lab after six months, plus or minus a 
few weeks.  These 156 subjects repeated the same exact 72 choice items from the initial session.  
Whereas all results reported until now are based on the full sample of 881 using only information 
collected from subjects’ initial sessions, we now analyze within-person differences in responses 
between sessions for the 156 repeat subjects.   
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The primary measure of between-session inconsistency considered here is a count of the number 
of switches among 72 choice items.  Although this count of switches in each subject’s responses 
ranges, in theory, from 0 to 72, its empirical range is 31 to 72, as shown in the histogram in 
Figure 3.  We attempt to use the information provided by this extensive variation among subjects 
in the number of switches to estimate the conditional effect of between-session inconsistency on 
payoffs, revealing two more surprising results. The total payoff measure is computed just as 
before, but this time using second-session choice data.    
 
Table 10 presents three regression models of total expected payoffs as a quadratic function of the 
number of switches.  In Models 1 through 4, the conditional mean payoff is first increasing and 
then decreasing in the number of switches, indicated by the concave quadratic.  We want to 
calculate the ranges of the switch count variable over which expected payoffs are increasing and 
decreasing.  After fitting a quadratic conditional mean, it is straightforward to compute the 
“optimal” number of switches as the number of switches that maximizes the conditional mean 
expected payoff.  Interestingly, the optimal number of switches according to the quadratic 
regression lines in Models 1, 2 and 3 are 56.8, 59.5 and 57.9, respectively--very near the sample 
median of the switch count variable, which is 57.5.  Thus, in the first three models, the median 
subject is optimally inconsistent between sessions from the point of view of expected payoffs.   
 
According to Table 10, between-session inconsistency is a statistically significant predictor of 
payoffs in Models 1, 2 and 3.  In Model 2 with risk but not with other forms of inconsistency, the 
number of switches remains correlated with payoffs.  In Model 3, between-session inconsistency 
retains its predictive power after controlling for time-inconsistency and inconsistency with 
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respect to expected-utility theory.  In Model 4, however, with risk and other inconsistency 
controls included, the coefficients on between-session inconsistency become statistically 
insignificant.  However, the magnitude of the effect is sometimes large, with the conditional 
mean covering a range of more than $190 as the number of switches varies from 31 to 72 while 
holding all other regressors constant.  Perhaps the most important result from Table 10 is that, 
after controlling for between-session inconsistency (in Models 3 and 4), time-inconsistency and 
EU-violator status continue to function as robust predictors of total payoffs. 
 
Section 4: Conclusion 
Inconsistency isn’t always good, isn’t always bad 
We have some evidence that impatience often leads to economic outcomes that seem not to be 
desirable by objective evaluative criteria.  For example, students who choose partying now over 
studying tend to get worse grades, drop out of school, earn less income, get sick with a higher 
likelihood, and die sooner.  However, the normative economics of behavioral economics remains 
stuck on internal consistency, rather than context-specific measures of absolute performance 
(e.g., test scores, graduation, earnings, incidence of disease, and lifespan).  The standard 
normative economics (also the normative perspective of perhaps most behavioral economists) is 
fixated on consumer sovereignty.  Who’s to criticize a student who values parties now over good 
grades at the end of the semester?  Who can question trading off more income later for more fun 
in the present—that’s the essence of economic man.  And people who eat bad food now and get 
sick and die sooner than average are simply revealing a preference for immediate food pleasure 
over extra years of life.   
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A single choice
sooner and smaller payoff: x arriving at date t 0
later and larger payoff: y arriving at t2 1
Definition of a time-tradeoff sequence
Choice 1 x arriving at t1 v. x(1 + r1)(t2 - t1) arriving at t2, (code choice as C1 in {0, 1})
Choice 2 x arriving at t1 v. x(1 + r2)(t2 - t1) arriving at t2, (code choice as C2 in {0, 1})
Choice J x arriving at t1 v. x(1 + rJ)(t2 - t1) arriving at t2, (code choice as CJ in {0, 1})
A realization of a single choice sequence can be represented as a 1xJ string of 0s and 1s: C1C2…CJ.
Definition: The time-choice sequence S is more patient  than S' if S > S', evaluated as integers.
One of the eight choice sequences that subjects faced (denoted S5 below)
65 arriving today  
Table 1: Construction of Time-Tradeoff Data
C
code choice C as:
b) Fix the sooner and smaller payoff at x dollars and the two arrival dates measured in years, t1 and t2.  Then 
parameterize the later and larger payoff y in terms of annualized rates of return rj, yj = x(1 + rj)(t2 - t1), where rj 
ranges over r1, r2, …, rJ, to produce the following sequence of binary choices:
c)  5 binary choices (J=5), where the first option's payoff is x = 65, the first option's arrival date is t1 = today, the 
second option's arrival date is t2 = one year from today, and the between-arrival duration t2-t1 = 1 year:
a) Let C denote a binary choice between a sooner payoff versus a larger payoff (i.e., x at t1 versus y at t2, with x < 
y and t1 < t2):
Choice 1:    
. . .
68.25 [5% more] arriving in one year
65 arriving today 
78 [20% more] arriving in one year 
65 arriving today
98.5 [50% more] arriving in one year 
65 arriving today 
130 [100% more] arriving in one year 
65 arriving today
195 [200% more] arriving in one year
The sequence of five choices is coded as a 1x5 strings of 0s and 1s: C1C2C3C4C5.
The following sequences are ordered from least to most patient: 00000, 00001, 00011, 00111, 01111, 11111.
arrival of 
first payoff
t1 t2-t1 = 1 month t2-t1 = 1 year
today S1 S5
tomorrow S2 S6
in 1 month S3 S7
in 1 year S4 S8
Eight arrival-date conditions for each subject, first, holding between-arrival waiting duration constant and 
shifting arrival dates into the future for four conditions, and then repeating with between-arrival waiting duration 
changed from 1 month to 1 year
between-arrival waiting durations
Choice 2:    
Choice 3:    
Choice 4:    
d) Time-choice data in this study consist of eight choice sequences of length five (40 binary choices in total), each 
with fixed x, and annualized rates of return: 5, 20, 50, 100 and 200 percent.  Between-arrival waiting duration, t2 - 
t1, is 1 month for the first four sequence and 1 month for the last four sequences:
Choice 5:    
Definition of time inconsistency: one or more mismatches among S1, S2, S3 and S4, or one or more mismatches 
among S5, S6, S7 and S8.
choice 
sequences
# 
subjects
choice 
sequences
# 
subjects
 00000 272  00000 171 109 62 36.1 10.7
 00001 160 579 time inconsistent  00001 90 35 55 11.6 9.5
 00011 213 <-------≠------->  00011 173 63 110 20.9 19.0
 00101 1
 00110 1  00110 1 1 0.2
|  00111 74  00111 66 10 56 3.3 9.7
|  01011 1
|  01100 1
V  01111 58  01111 60 16 44 5.3 7.6
more  10011 1
Table 2: Empirical Distributions* for a Pair of Choice Sequences
empirical distributions of consistent v. inconsistent
percentage 
among the 
consistent
percentage 
among the 
inconsistent
Choice sequences: now versus one month 
from now
Choice sequences: 12 months versus 13 
months from now # time-
consistent 
subjects
# time- 
inconsistent 
subjects**
patient  10101 1 1 0.2
 10111 1  10111 1 1 0.2
 11000 1
 11011 1 1 0.2
 11100 1 1 0.2
 11110 1 1 0.2
 11111 97  11111 315 69 246 22.8 42.5
Total: 881 881 302 579 100.0 100.0
**Among consistent subjects, the empirical distributions are by definition identical in both choice sequences.  Among the inconsistent, the 
distribution presented in the table shows choices for the second sequence (t1 = 12 months from today versus t2 = 13 months from today)--in 
other words, where subjects shifted to.
*Empirical distributions tabulate the number of individuals who choose different sequences over 5 binary decisions.  The left-most 
distribution is parameterized by arrival times of today and one month from today.  The second distribution has arrival times of one year from 
today and 13 months from today.  In both cases, the five binary choices are defined by increasing rewards for waiting an extra month for the 
later payoff, ranging from annual rates of return of 5, 20, 50, 100 and 200 percent.  The 302 subjects who choose two identical sequences are 
referred to as consistent (at least for this pair of choice sequences).  The 579 whose choice sequences do not match are referred to as 
inconsistent.  Empirical frequency and percentage distributions for both subsamples are presented to the right. 
Duration between arrivals of payoffs is one month
sequence sequence 2 sequence 3 sequence 4
Now v. Tomorrow v. 1month v. 1year v.
1 month 1day+1month 2months 1year+1month
152 385 449
Table 3: Construction of TI, an Indicator of Time Inconsistency (Unequal Choice 
Sequences Over Evenly Spaced Cashflows with Different Starting Dates)
union of subjects with one or more mismatches = 
TI_month, which includes 636 individuals
TI = 1 if TI_month==1 or TI_year==1, 0 otherwise.
In other words, TI = 1 if any of the following six pairs of choice sequences 
involving time trade-offs (indicated by curving arrows) fails to match.  By this 
definition, 758 of 881 subjects are time inconsistent.
mismatching 
choice 
sequence?
mismatching 
choice 
sequence?
mismatching 
choice 
sequence?
Duration between arrivals of payoffs is one year
sequence sequence 6 sequence 7 sequence 8
Now v. Tomorrow v. 1month v. 1year v.
1 year 1day+1year 13 months 2 years
187 254 469
union of subjects with one or more mismatches = 
TI_year, which includes 614 individuals
mismatching 
choice 
sequence?
mismatching 
choice 
sequence?
mismatching 
choice 
sequence?
Total
consistent 123 122 255
inconsistent 144 492 636
Total 267 614 881
consistent inconsistent1-month treatment
Table 4: Cross-Tabulation of Time Inconsistency in 1-Month versus 
1-Year Between-Duration Treatments
1-year treatment
sample
frequency all 1-month 1-year all 1-month 1-year all 1-month 1-year all 1-month 1-year HYPER HYPO
-4 5 2
-3 57 1 3 22 1 3
-2 159 37 67 63 19 36
-1 326 243 372 156 106 262 144
0 123 245 267 267 353 537 334 600 439 285 373 384 670 737
1 164 339 377 290 397 294 188 278 170 211
2 245 244 178 221 124 49 112 97 25
3 206 53 59 84 7 1 43 7 1
4 97 18 9
5 40 1 1
6 6    
**Net_HYP_count is the sum of HYP_count and HYPO_count, tallying a net count on shifts toward patience after allowing shifts in 
opposite directions to cancel.
***Pure_HYP (Pure_HYPO) is an indicator = 1 if at least one shift toward patience (impatience) and zero shifts toward impatience 
(patience) were observed.  These variables follow the definitions of hyperbolic and hypo-bolic discounting (allowing for no shifts in the 
opposite direction) given in the text.
Table 5A: Frequency Distributions for Time Inconsistency, Hyper- and Hypo-bolic Discounting
*The variable TI_count tallies the number of time-inconsistencies (i.e., mismatching choice sequences illustrated in Table 2) observed out of 
a possible six comparable pairs.  HYP_count (HYPO_count) begins from zero and adds "1" ("-1") every time a subject shifts in the direction 
of patience (impatience) as payoff arrival dates move further into the future holding between-arrival-waiting duration fixed.
TI_count* HYP_count* HYPO_count* NetHYP_count** Pure***
sample
frequency all 1-month 1-year all 1-month 1-year all 1-month 1-year all 1-month 1-year HYPER HYPO
-4 1 1
-3 24 17
-2 136 18 28 57 18 28
-1 335 238 353 169 104 250 168
0 146 270 314 314 392 592 385 625 500 295 404 417 642 713
1 211 388 411 319 418 264 204 284 161 239
2 266 223 156 194 71 25 94 71 25
3 218 49 39
4 40 5 5
*Table 5B is a modified version of Table 5A after removing counts of inconsistency from pairs of time-tradeoff sequences with any options 
to receive same-day payoffs.  The data do not support the interpretation that time-inconsistencies are mostly generated by same-day choice 
items or that, after removing same-day-payoff choice items, most time-inconsistency can be explained as hyperbolic shifts.  Eliminating 
same-day-payoff choice items from consideration increases the number of time-consistent subjects by only 23, from 123 to 146.  And 
removing those items increases the number of pure hyperbolic discounters by only 28, from 211 to 239.
**Net_HYP_count is the sum of HYP_count and HYPO_count, tallying a net count on shifts toward patience after allowing shifts in 
opposite directions to cancel.
***Pure_HYP (Pure_HYPO) is an indicator = 1 if at least one shift toward patience (impatience) and zero shifts toward impatience 
(patience) were observed.  These variables follow the definitions of hyperbolic and hypo-bolic discounting (allowing for no shifts in the 
opposite direction) given in the text.
Table 5B: Frequency Distributions for Time Inconsistency, Hyper- and Hypo-bolic Discounting with Same-Day-Payoff Choice Items 
Removed*
TI_count* HYP_count* HYPO_count* NetHYP_count** Pure***
1-month treatments
1-year treatments
Figure 1: No Evidence for Hyperbolic Discounting in Net 
Number of Shifts Toward Patience (as arrival dates move 
further into the future)
all treatments
A: B: 
$60 for sure
choice 2 Total
359 53 412
Total 768 113 881
Table 6: Conflicting* Choices among Two Mean-Preserving Spreads
$120 with prob 5/10, $0 
otherwise
choice 1
*Because a risk-neutral agent is indifferent between A and B, and indifferent between C and D, 
the 409 + 53 = 462 subjects on the off-diagonal cells above are not necessarily violating expected 
utility theory.  However, of these 462 subjects, only 37 provide risk-neutral responses on the Holt-
Laury instrument measuring risk preferences, and only 25 provide responses on both Holt-Laury 
and Eckel-Grossman that are consistent with risk neutrality.
469D: $80 with prob 5/10, $40 
otherwise 409 60
C: $60 for sure
expected-utility violations # violators out of 881
RiskLoving&Averse in Two Mean-Preserving Spreads 462 (422 if risk-neutral HL excluded)
RiskLoving&Averse+EG 521 (496 if risk-neutral HL excluded)
Holt-Laury Nonmonotonic 79
Ambiguity Nonmonotonic 57
Yes-to-Big/No-to-Low Risk 66
All EU Violations 553 (576 if we don't exclude HL risk-neutral)
Indicator = 1 for any of the above EU violations, except that the violators from the mean-preserving 
spread items are not counted for the 84 subjects with perfectly risk-neutral responses to Holt Laury, 
since inconsistency on choices over mean-preserving spreads is consistent with risk neutrality.
Table 7: Violations of Expected Utility Theory in 38 Risky Choices
Inconsistent responses on two binary choice items involving mean-preserving spreads: sure-thing $60 
v. $80 with probability 0.5 and $40 otherwise; and sure-thing $60 v. $120 with probability 0.5 and 0 
otherwise. Inconsistency on these items do not violate EU theory in case of risk-neutral preferences.  In the broadest, all-
inclusive indicator of non-EU behavior (the variable "All EU Violations" at the bottom of this list), inconsistent responses 
on these mean-preserving spreads are not  counted if the same subject's responses to the Holt-Laury items are perfectly risk 
neutral.
Inconsistent responses among three items, including previous two, and 6-gamble choice problem 
(Eckel-Grossman) which includes one gamble that is a mean-preserving spread of another gamble.  
An EU maximizer (who is not risk neutral) must answer these three items consistently.
10 binary choices between gambles with fixed payoffs and probabilities of winning ranging from 0.10 
through 1.00.  Nonmonotonic responders have risk preferences with no EU representation.  The last 
binary choice in the sequence is between two sure-thing payoffs, $40 v $77, revealing 6 subjects who 
apparently prefer $40 over $77.
16 binary choices between an ambiguous gamble (probability of winning between 0.60 and 0.90) and 
increasing sure-thing payoffs.  EU maximizers with any subjective probability of winning cannot have 
nonmonotonic choice sequences.  
Choose gamble with EV=82.5 and sd=126 over 75 for sure, and choose 120 for sure over EV=140 and 
sd=70.  These subjects take 82.5-75 = 7.5 as compensation for bearing risk of sd=126 in the first 
choice, but refuse an EV premium of 140-120 = 20 to bear risk of sd=70 in the second choice.
min mean max
3764.3 4573.8 4923.4 1159.1 ∆ E[total payoff] 213.5 112.3
p-value* 0.0000 0.0000
10.3 89.7 211.5 201.3 ∆σ 4.7 22.5
p-value 0.2807 0.0000
2566.4 3246.9 3496.5 930.2 ∆ time payoffs 199.0 93.1
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
1283.2 1329.2 1357.9 74.7 ∆ 1-month payoffs 11.4 6.7
p-value 0.0000 0.0001
1283.2 1917.7 2138.6 855.5 ∆ 1-year payoffs 187.5 86.4
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
1165.4 1326.9 1427.9 262.5 ∆ risky payoffs 14.5 19.3
p-value 0.0162 0.0000
28.0 32.6 36.0 8.0 ∆ Eckel Grossman 0.5 0.8
p-value 0.0325 0.0000
370.4 459.1 491.9 121.5 ∆ Holt Laury 2.2 4.2
p-value 0.4373 0.0391
498.0 592.7 633.0 135.0 ∆ Ambiguity 10.8 12.2
p-value 0.0036 0.0000
355.0 362.6 387.5 32.5 ∆ Other Gambles 1.1 2.1
p-value 0.2956 0.0038
risky payoffs
Eckel-
Grossman 
payoff
*Unconditional t tests of the equality of means among inconsistent versus consistent subpopulations 
produced the p-values in this table.
other 
gambles
Table 8: Increases in Expected Dollar Payoffs among Time- and EU-Inconsistent Subjects
payoff 
measure
time-inconsistent 
v. time-consistent
EU-violators v. 
non-violators
unconditional  difference in mean payoffs: 
inconsistent versus consistent subsamples
summary statistics in levels among the 
entire sample
total payoff
size of 
range
time payoffs
1-month 
time payoff
individual σ
1-year time 
payoff
Holt-Laury 
payoffs
ambiguity 
payoffs
Figure 2: The Risk-Reward Envelope (consistent subjects represented by squares, and time-
inconsistent and/or EU-violators represented by dots)
variables coeff t stat coeff t stat coeff t stat
TI 198.70 7.2 196.50 7.5 197.35 7.7
EU-violator 96.68 4.9 56.59 2.9 47.23 2.5
Individual σ 1.79 8.5 1.93 9.2
Under 25 28.89 1.2
Female 15.52 0.8
Immigrant 0.00 0.1
Married -16.46 -0.8
Ontario -138.58 -3.3
British Columbia -69.67 -1.5
Nova Scotia -79.84 -1.8
Alberta -124.09 -2.7
Native Person -22.88 -0.4
Disabled 8.03 0.3
French Speaker -22.95 -0.4
Burdened by Debt -20.62 -1.1
Sell Asset to Pay Debt -68.38 -2.4
Medium Household Income 48.80 2.2
High Household Income 90.45 3.7
Not Working -41.58 -1.5
Completed High School -132.13 -2.6
Liked School -11.67 -0.5
Peers Liked School 46.07 2.2
Performed Well in School 57.07 3.0
Constant 4342.17 160.2 4208.89 138.2 4208.08 61.5
R squared
Table 9: Regressions of expected payoffs on inconsistency, risk 
taking, and other controls (N = 881)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
0.0636 0.1575 0.2285
Figure 3: Empirical distribution of between-session switches in 72 time-tradeoff and risky choices
variables coeff t stat coeff t stat coeff t stat coeff t stat
#switches 119.25 3.2 81.73 2.3 96.21 2.5 42.81 1.3
#switches^2 -1.05 -3.1 -0.69 -2.1 -0.83 -2.4 -0.42 -1.3
Individual σ 2.84 4.5 1.29 2.2
TI 148.47 1.9 191.32 2.8
EU-violator 132.03 2.5 121.43 2.6
constant 1112.55 1.1 1846.73 1.9 1500.46 1.5 3154.22 3.5
#obs 156
*A subsample of 156 subjects was invited back six months after their initial sessions to 
exactly repeat the 72 decisions they had made earlier.  The variable #switches counts the 
number of switches, which in theory ranges from 0 to 72.  The empirical range is 31 to 72.  
The maximizers of the quadratic regression lines in Models 1, 2 and 3 are 56.8, 59.5 and 57.9, 
respectively, which is very near the sample median, 57.5.  The maximizer in Model 4 is 50.8.
Table 10: Regression of Second-Session* Expected Payoffs as a Quadratic Function of the 
Number of Between-Session Switches
Model 1 Model 3Model 2 Model 4
